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Abstract   
 
This study investigates the interactive effect of an independent audit committee on the relationship concerning 
ownership structure and discretionary loss provisions. The study utilizes 29 listed Nigerian financial institutions 
as a sample using data from 2006 to 2015. The results establish that audit committee independence negatively 
influences discretionary loss provisions. Furthermore, it is found that CEO, block and foreign ownership have a 
direct influence on discretionary loss provisions. Moreover, audit committee independence moderates these direct 
relationships negatively. While institutional ownership has a direct influence on discretionary loss provisions, 
similarly, audit committee independence moderates this direct relationship positively. Additionally, audit 
committee independence fails to moderate but has a direct influence on discretionary loss provisions. Conversely, 
audit committee independence fails to moderate the relationship between the executive and non-executive 
ownership with discretionary loss provisions. The study suggests that relevant authorities should impose laws to 
motivate firms to have more independent members in audit committee to reduce conflicts of interest between the 
executive and non-executive ownership over the audit committee members’ composition to protect the interests 
of other shareholders.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Accounting manoeuvres are used in accrual-based earnings manipulations by executives on the reported earnings 
(Maigoshi, Latif, & Kamardin, 2016). Like executive of non-financial firms, financial firms’ the executives can 
use accruals to manage their income to fine-tune earnings to exploit firm and/or personal interest (Liu & Ryan, 
2006; Norden, & Stoian, 2013). The sole difference between them is the technique used to participate in earnings 
management. Unlike managers in other industries, managers of financial firms usually employed loan loss 
provisions or loss reserve accrual (also known as an unearned premium or unexpired risks) to influence reported 
earnings (Chang, Shen, & Fang, 2008). Furthermore, the primary accruals of financial firms, loss provisions which 
play a more complex role than the accruals of non-financial companies for 2 reasons (Dou, Ryan, & Zou, 2018; 
Norden, & Stoian, 2013). Loss provisions are likely to replicate expected losses by executives (Anandarajan, 
Hasan, & McCarthy, 2006; Chang et al., 2008; Dou et al., 2018). The loss provisions cannot truthfully equal to 
the real losses also can contain a margin for erroneousness. This margin for erroneousness is what is raised to as 
the discretionary element of the loss provisions that have been manipulating by financial firms (Anandarajan et 
al., 2006; Bushman & Williams, 2012). 
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Moreover, loss provisions are a quite great accrual for a financial firm and, thus, influences its earnings and 
shareholdings (Anandarajan et al., 2006). Nevertheless, management of these financial firms have inspirations to 
utilise the provisions of loan loss to manage earnings (Dou et al., 2018; Norden, & Stoian, 2013). Hence, it can 
be used for accrual earnings management. Moreover, previous studies largely claim that executives involve in 
earnings management for various motives and possibly work out their financial reporting discretion to affect stated 
earnings (Beatty & Liao, 2011; Bushman & Williams, 2012; Chang et al., 2008; Dou et al., 2018; Norden, & 
Stoian, 2013).  
 
Notwithstanding any grounds for executives to manipulate earnings, earnings management activities indicate a 
conflict of interest between shareholders and management (Chang et al., 2008). When managers deviously 
manipulate earnings through discretionary loss provisions, shareholders may perhaps evade or pull out investment 
from financial firms with high discretionary loss provisions to minimize approaching losses (Ma, & Song, 2015). 
Furthermore, agency theory and resource dependence theory emphasise that an independent audit committee can 
decrease these earnings manipulation (Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2015). Therefore, this study exactly investigates 
the moderating role of an independent audit committee on the relationship between ownership structure and 
discretionary loss provisions in the Nigerian financial sector. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999) loan loss provisions are extremely reliant on management’s decisions and 
openly related to the financial firms’ vital assets and liabilities. Moreover, loan loss provisions are usually very 
huge proportionate to net income as well as firm’s equity. Consequently, due to the significance of financial firms’ 
loan loss provisions, it will likely to be a good measurement earnings management in financial institutions (Cohen, 
Cornett, Marcus, & Tehranian, 2014). However, for the insurance companies, in line with Beaver, McNichols, 
and Nelson, (2003); Gaver and Paterson (2004) the insurance loss reserve accrual (also known as unexpired risks 
or unearned premium) use as a discretionary loss provisions proxy. As loss reserves signify the major charge on 
insurers’ accounts, whereas under-reserving decreases stated liabilities and rise insurance companies’ assets, and 
as a result empowers insurance companies to appear safer than and vice versa (Veprauskaite & Adams, 2014). 
Moreover, Beaver et al. (2003) explain that insurance companies’ managers can understate loss reserves with the 
aim of reducing stated loss liabilities and evade financial distress as well as insolvency.  
 
Moreover, previous studies on ownership structure and discretionary accruals provide mixed findings. For 
instance, in line with the convergence of interest hypothesis, some scholars found a negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and discretionary accruals (Ali, Salleh, & Hassan, 2008; Alves, 2012; Alzoubi, 2016; 
Ramadan, 2016). However, consistent with entrenchment effects hypothesis, some scholars found a positive 
relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals (Farouk & Hassan, 2014; Waweru & Prot, 
2018). Also, in line with the convergence of interest hypothesis Ali et al. (2008); and Alzoubi (2016) established 
a negative relationship between non-executive ownership and discretionary accruals. However, the entrenchment 
effects hypothesis, Alzoubi (2016); and Darko, Aribi, and Uzonwanne (2016) claim a positive relationship 
between non-executive ownership and discretionary accruals. Furthermore, consistent with the efficient-
enhancing effect hypothesis, Alves (2012); Kurawa and Saheed (2014); and Ramadan (2016) found an inverse 
relationship between block ownership and discretionary accruals. Whereas, in corroboration with outright 
expropriation hypothesis, Farooq and El Jai (2012); and Isenmila and Afensimi (2012) claimed a positive 
relationship between block ownership and discretionary accruals. 
  
Furthermore, consistent with the active monitoring hypothesis, Ali et al. (2008), Guo, Huang, Zhang, and Zhou 
(2015); and Kim (2015) found a negative relationship between foreign ownership and discretionary accruals. 
However, in corroboration with transient investment hypothesis, Guo and Ma (2015); and Paik and Koh (2014) 
claimed a positive relationship between foreign ownership and discretionary accruals. Moreover, in line with 
efficient monitoring hypothesis, it had been claimed that an increasing institutional ownership leads to decreasing 
discretionary accruals in the companies (Yang, Chun, & Ramadili, 2009). Conversely, in line with hands-off 
passivity hypothesis, some studies have provided empirical evidence that institutional ownership increases firms’ 
discretionary accruals (Alves, 2012; Agyei & Owusu, 2014; Emamgholipour & Mansourinia, 2013; Lemma, 
Negash, Mlilo, and Lulseged, 2018). Therefore, based on these inconclusive findings and opposing hypothesis 
there to introduce a moderating variable which may strengthen or weaken these relationships.  
 
On the other hand, previous researchers provide proof that an independent audit committee is related to 
discretionary accruals (Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2015; Amin, Lukviarman, Suhardjanto, & Setiany, 2018; Salleh 
& Haat, 2014). Moreover, the agency theory and resource dependence theory assert that an independent audit 
committee influences discretionary accruals (Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2015). Likewise, previous studies claimed 
that audit committee characterised by many independent members is expected to be more effective in undertaking 
their motoring role and lower the discretionary accruals earnings manipulation (Al-Matari, Fadzil, & Al-Swidi, 
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2014; Lin, Li & Yang, 2006). Therefore, established on the agency theory and resource dependence theory, it is 
predicted that an independent audit committee should be competent in aiding the investors in the monitoring of 
the firm’s discretionary accruals. Hence, hypothesise that: 
 





This study uses the sample of 29 listed Nigerian financial institutions that existed from 2006 to 2015. The study 
excluded all firms that had been listed on the Nigeria Stock Exchange outside this period. Moreover, all firms 
without complete data were excluded. The period is chosen because it is the period in which the financial sector 
has undergone a series of restructuring in Nigeria. 
 
Based on the established relationship between ownership structure and discretionary loss provisions, a direct effect 
model between dependent and independent variables are derived as: 
DLPit = α0 + α1COit + α2EOit + α3NOit + α4BOit + α5FOit + α6IOit + α7ACIit+ α8FSit + ϵit.  Model 1 
 
Furthermore, a hierarchical model is developed by adding the interaction effect moderating variables audit 
committee independence on the above direct effect model as: 
DLPit = α0 + α1COit + α2EOit + α3NOit + α4BOit + α5FOit + α6IOit + α7ACIit+ α8COit * ACIit + α9EOit * ACIit + 
α10NOit * ACIit + α11BOit * ACIit + α12FOit * ACIit + α13IOit * ACIit + α14FSit + ϵit.    Model 2 
 
Based on the previous studies the study variables are measurements are present in Table 1 as flows:  
 
Table 1. Study Variables and Measurement 
Variable Acronyms Measurement Previous Studies 
Dependent Variable 
   
Discretionary loan loss 
provisions 
DLP The absolute value of accruals loan loss 
provisions to total liabilities 
Beatty and Liao (2011); Norden and 
Stoian (2013); Kazemian and Sanusi 
(2015) 
Independent Variables 
   
CEO Ownership CO The proportion of shares held by CEO 
shareholding to total shares 
Alves, (2012); Liu and Tsai (2015) 
Executives’ ownership EO The proportion of executive directors’ 
shareholding to total shares  
Alzoubi (2016); Said, Zainuddin and 
Haron (2009); Sani and Musa (2017) 
Non-Executives’ ownership NO The proportion of non-executive directors’ 
shareholding to total shares 
Alzoubi (2016); Bhagat and Black 
(2001); Darko et al. (2016) 
Block Ownership BO The proportion of owners with above 5% 
shareholding to total shares 
Fitri, Irianto, and Mardiati (2017); 
Miko and Kamardin (2015).  
Foreign Ownership FO The proportion of foreign investors 
shareholding to total shares in the firm 
Guo and Ma (2015); Greenaway, 
Guariglia, and Yu (2014).  
Institutional Ownership IO The proportion of institutional investors 
shareholding to total shares in the firm 
Lemma et al. (2018); Miko and 
Kamardin (2015) 
Moderating Variable 
   
Audit Committee 
Independence 
ACI The proportion of non-executive audit 
committee members to a total number of 
audit committee members 
Al-Matari et al. (2014); Al-Rassas 
and Kamardin (2015); Amin et al. 
(2018) 
Control Variables 
   
Firm Size FS Natural logarithm of total asset Azzali and Mazza (2018); Sani and 
Madaki (2016); Waweru and Prot 
(2018) 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
Table 2 which shows the result for the descriptive statistics for all variables of the study, discloses the average 
discretionary loan loss provisions of 5.1%, with a standard deviation of 7% from one firm to another. Moreover, 
some of the firm under study have almost 0% of their total liabilities as reported discretionary loan loss provisions. 
Whereas, some firms have almost 42.8% of their total liabilities as reported discretionary loan loss provisions. 
Furthermore, the sampled firms have an average of 0.9% as CEO shareholding with the variability of 1.94% along 
with a minimum of 0% and a maximum of 13.61%. Likewise, the sampled firms have an average of 1.4% 
executive ownership with the standard deviation of 2.44% and a minimum of 0% and a maximum of 13.61%. 
Moreover, the range of the non-executive directors’ shareholding of the sampled firm is between 0 to 85.61% 
with a mean and standard deviation of 15.64% and 18.92% respectively. Furthermore, the average block 
shareholding is 34.51% with a difference of 25.43%. While some of the sampled firms have no block shareholding, 
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some other firms have as much as 85.89 as block shareholding. Likewise, range of foreign shareholding is between 
0.00% to 85.89%, with an average and standard deviation of 11.78 and 18.78% respectively. Also, the reported 
range of institutional shareholding is between 0% to 85.89%, with an average and standard deviation of 36.30% 
and 25.24% respectively. Also, the range of audit committee is between 66.70% to 100% with independent 
members. Whereas, the sampled firms have an average 95.40% independent members in their audit committee 
with a standard deviation of 9.5%. Whereas, for the skewness and kurtosis all variables have below 3.00 and 10.00 
respectively with exception of CEO ownership which has 3.236 and 14.560 respectively. This is due to a high 
disparity among the CEO shareholding in the Nigerian financial sector.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables 
Variable OBS Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
DLP 290 0.051 0.070 0.000 0.428 2.145 8.097 
CO 290 0.009 0.019 0.000 0.136 3.236 14.560 
EO 290 0.014 0.024 0.000 0.136 2.329 8.067 
NO 290 0.156 0.189 0.000 0.856 1.602 4.905 
BO 290 0.345 0.254 0.000 0.859 0.183 1.843 
FO 290 0.118 0.188 0.000 0.859 1.742 5.219 
IO 290 0.363 0.252 0.000 0.859 0.145 1.877 
ACI 290 0.954 0.095 0.667 1.000 -1.911 5.389 
FS 290 18.422 2.302 13.838 22.264 0.022 1.465 
 
Based on Table 3, the dependent variable discretionary loan loss provisions positively correlated with the block 
ownership and institutional ownership at 1% level of significance. Meanwhile, discretionary loan loss provisions 
negatively correlated with audit committee independence and firm size at 1% level of significance. While the 
association between discretionary loan loss provisions and foreign ownership was significant and negative at 5%. 
However, the correlation between discretionary loan loss provisions and non-executive ownership is positive and 
significant at 10%. Whereas, the association between CEO ownership with the executive ownership was positive 
and significant at 1%. However, the association between CEO ownership with the institutional ownership was 
negative and significant at 1%. While CEO ownership association with the block ownership is negative and 
significant at 5%; likewise, CEO ownership association with the foreign ownership was negative and significant 
at 1%. Similarly, executive ownership negatively correlated with block ownership and institutional ownership at 
1%. And a negatively correlated with foreign ownership at 5%. Likewise, the association between non-executive 
ownership with the block ownership was positive at 1% significant level. Conversely, the association between 
non-executive ownership with an independent audit committee and firm size was negative and significant at 1%. 
Similarly, non-executive ownership positively correlated with the foreign ownership at 5%. The correlation 
between block ownership was positive with the foreign ownership and institutional ownership at 5%, but it has a 
negative and significant relationship with the firm size at 1%. Similarly, block ownership negatively correlated 
with an independent audit committee at 5%. Whereas, the correlation between foreign ownership and institutional 
ownership was positive and significant at 1% and with firm size at 5%. However, institutional ownership has a 
significant negative relationship with firm size at 1%. Correspondingly, an independent audit committee has a 
positive correlation with firm size at 1%. Moreover, the range of variance inflation factor (VIF) is between 1.23 
to 6.07 which specifies the absence of Multicollinearity problem.  
 
Table 3. Pearson Correlation Matrix of the Variables 
  DLP CO EO NO BO FO IO ACI FS VIF 
DLP 1.0000          
CO 0.0600 1.0000        2.52 
EO 0.0315 0.7703*** 1.0000       1.23 
NO 0.1049* -0.0553 -0.0524 1.0000      2.58 
BO 0.2962*** -0.1351** -0.2123*** 0.3227*** 1.0000     6.07 
FO -0.1324** -0.1000* -0.1334** 0.1406** 0.4361*** 1.0000    1.57 
IO 0.2479*** -0.1511*** -0.2258*** 0.3341*** 0.8975*** 0.4919*** 1.0000   5.67 
ACI -0.2558*** 0.0841 0.0235 -0.1607*** -0.1203** 0.0497 -0.0863 1.0000  1.15 
FS -0.5552*** 0.0248 0.0892 -0.3519*** -0.4557*** 0.1328** -0.3393*** 0.3381*** 1.0000 1.82 
***, **, * indicates that the estimates significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
As discussed earlier, an independent audit committee is expected to moderate the relationship between ownership 
structure and discretionary loan loss provisions. Therefore, to examine this moderating effect hierarchical 
regression had been run.  Furthermore, to choose an appropriate regression method, diagnostic tests have run. 
These tests comprise of autocorrelation, cross-sectional dependence, Hausman specification, heteroscedasticity, 
and Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier (BPML) have been run on the hierarchical regression equation. 
Based on BPML as well as Hausman specification tests a random effect is preferred in both models. Furthermore, 
from both models, there is the absence of autocorrelation in panel data. However, evidence has shown an existence 
of group-wise heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence problems in the dataset. Therefore, to solve these 
problems an adjusted Driscoll and Kraay’s standard errors were run as recommended by Hoechle, (2007). This is 
presented in table 4. 
 
Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Accounting Studies (ICAS 2018) 
16-17 October 2018, Penang, Malaysia 
77 
Table 4. Results of Discretionary loss provisions Direct and Hierarchical Models Using Fixed-Effects with Driscoll and 
Kraay’s Standard Errors 
  Direct Model Hierarchical Model 
DLP Coef. t Coef. T 
CO 0.1249 0.4600 15.1601*** 4.0400 
EO 0.2075* 1.7500 1.1489 0.9300 
NO -0.0466* -1.7800 -0.2492 -0.9700 
BO -0.0025 -0.0700 0.8150*** 2.8900 
FO -0.0489* -1.7500 0.4667* 2.0200 
IO 0.0582*** 3.2700 -0.4913 -1.6000 



















FS -0.0150*** -6.9800 -0.0143*** -7.3700 
Cons 0.3803*** 6.3000 0.1664 1.6800 
R-square  0.3539 0.3878 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
BPLM test for random effects 0.0102 0.0405 
Hausman specifications 0.5413 0.9336 
Pesaran's test of cross-sectional independence 0.0000 0.0000 
Modified Wald test for Groupwise heteroskedasticity 0.0000 0.0000 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 0.2488 0.1505 
***, **, * indicates that the estimates significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
As in Table 4, it is shown that an independent audit committee has a negative influence on discretionary loss 
provisions. This is consistent with agency theory and findings of Al-Matari et al. (2014); Lin et al. (2006) that an 
independent audit committee reduces discretionary accruals. Furthermore, CEO ownership is found to have an 
insignificant positive effect on discretionary loss provisions. Conversely, the presence of an independent audit 
committee makes it significant negative. Hence, this means an independent audit committee improves the 
relationship between CEO ownership and discretionary loss provisions. As for the overall executive ownership 
impact on the discretionary loss provisions, executive ownership has a direct positive and significant effect on 
discretionary loss provisions. This is consistent with the entrenchment effects hypothesis and findings of Farouk 
and Hassan (2014); Waweru and Prot, (2018). However, an independent audit committee has not been able to 
moderates this relationship in the Nigerian financial sector. This may be because the entrenchment behaviour of 
executive directors will not let them align with an independent audit committee in monitoring the firm’s financial 
activities.  
 
Furthermore, non-executive ownership has a direct effect significant negative on discretionary loss provisions. 
This is consistent with the convergence of interest hypothesis and findings of Ali et al. (2008); and Alzoubi (2016). 
However, an independent audit committee was not able to moderate such relationship. This is due to the 
entrenchment behaviour of non-executive directors will prevent them to support an independent audit committee 
to effectively monitor the firm’s financial activities. Moreover, block ownership has a negative insignificant effect 
on discretionary loss provisions. However, this insignificant effect had been upturned to significant by the 
presence of an independent audit committee as a moderating variable. This indicates that an independent audit 
committee improves the relationship between block ownership and discretionary loss provisions. 
  
Likewise, foreign ownership has a significant negative effect on discretionary loss provisions. This is consistent 
with the active monitoring hypothesis and findings of Ali et al. (2008), Guo et al. (2015); and Kim (2015). 
Similarly, an independent audit committee strengthens this negative relationship. Finally, institutional ownership 
has a significant positive effect on discretionary loss provisions. This is consistent with the hands-off passivity 
hypothesis and findings of Alves (2012); Agyei and Owusu (2014); Emamgholipour and Mansourinia (2013); and 
Lemma et al. (2018). Similarly, an independent audit committee strengthens this positive relation. This indicates 
that an independent audit committee worsens the relationship between institutional ownership and discretionary 
loss provisions. This may be because of hands-off passivity monitoring behaviour of some institutional investors 
may not let them align with an independent audit committee to effectively monitor firm’s financial activities. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
From the research findings, it is found that non-executive and foreign ownership have a direct negative influence 
on discretionary loss provisions. Whereas, executive and institutional ownership have a direct positive influence 
on discretionary loss provisions. However, CEO ownership and block ownership do not have a significant 
influence on discretionary loss provisions. Moreover, it can be observed that an independent audit committee 
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strengthens the negative relationship between some type of ownership (CEO, block and foreign) and discretionary 
loss provisions. These support both agency theory and resource dependency theory arguments that audit 
committee independence will help in effective monitoring firm financial activities to curtails discretionary 
earnings manipulations. Whereas, an independent audit committee worsen the relationship between institutional 
ownership and discretionary loss provisions. This is due to the in hands-off passivity approach of institutional 
investors that prevent them assist an independent audit committee in monitoring financial activities.  
 
However, the presence of audit committee independence fails to moderate the influence of executive and non-
executive ownership on discretionary loss provisions. This may be due to the entrenchment behaviour of both 
executive and non-executive shareholders may stop them to support an independent audit committee monitoring 
the firm’s financial activity effectively. Hence, this study suggests that regulators in Nigerian financial should 
strengthen the provision for more independence of audit committee. Specifically, the regulators should minimize 
the influence of both the executive and non-executive ownership on the audit committee members’ composition 
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